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LEGAL INTERSEC110NS 
Legal Representation of Birth Parents 
and Adoptive Parents 
Elizabeth Samuels 
Domestic infant adoption has two primary goals: (1) preventing the 
unnecessary separation of family members by ensuring that birth par-
ents make informed and deliberate decisions and (2) protecting the fi-
nality of adoptive placements. Ideally, these goals are complementary 
and can be balanced. There is, however, a danger of the second goal 
eclipsing the first. Many state laws appear to value an increase in infant 
adoptions over the goal of encouraging careful deliberation. Most do-
mestic infant adoptions involve powerful market forces as well as pow-
erful emotional pressures, and they occur in the context of a national 
commitment to encourage adoptions of older children and children with 
special needs. Infant adoption service providers' livelihoods or profits 
generally depend on successfully arranging adoptions for their primary 
clients, who, for the most part, are relatively prosperous, well-estab-
lished, and socially favored married couples whose desires to bear chil-
dren have been thwarted by infertility. In their efforts to adopt, these 
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couples often face great difficulties and pay high fees. By contrast, birth 
parents in the stressful situations that lead them to consider placing their 
infants for adoption are not an organized group and are relatively pow-
erless and socially disfavored. This article examines the role that legal 
representation of these pm1ies mayor may not play in independent adop-
tions in promoting the deliberate decision making and finality that char-
acterize ethically and humanely conducted adoptions. 
LEGAL REPRESENTATION ISSUES 
When birth parents consent to adoption, they are giving up their fun-
damental right to parent and are participating in a legal process in which 
a court determines whether it is in the best interest ofthe child to legally 
dissolve the child's birth family ties and to establish a new set of family 
relationships. Given the importance of this process for all the individu-
als affected by it, it is crucial that both birth and adoptive parents un-
derstand the legal process, includi ng the nature of their rights and the var-
ious options available to them. Representation by an attorney, of course, 
can provide the participants in the process with expert legal guidance. In 
independent adoptions, the most common type of domestic infant adop-
tion, a number of questions arise about legal representation. Is it permis-
sible for one attorney to represent both the adoptive and birth parents? 
Should the parties be required to have separate representation? Should 
the parties be required to have separate representation only in cases in 
which birth parents are minors or under some other disability? Although 
this article focuses on independent adoptions, concerns about legal rep-
resentation for birth parents also arises in agency-arranged adoptions 
because ofthe likelihood of conflicts of interest between an agency's re-
sponsibility to biIth parents and the agency's commitment to prospec-
tive parents who are paying the agency's fees. 
In an informal opinion in 1987, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility con-
cluded that an attorney may not ethically represent both birth and adop-
tive parents.l This opinion, which would apply to both agency and 
independent adoptions, is not binding on all states, however, and the 
laws on dual representation vary throughout the country. Dual represen-
tation is expressly pennitted in at least two states, Kansas,2 and Califor-
nia. In California, an attorney must have written consent of the parties 
before engaging in dual representation, and the attorney may not engage 
in dual representation "whenever a birth parent displays the slightest 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281477
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reason for the attorney to believe any controversy might arise."3 If a 
conflict arises after an attorney begins dual representation, the attorney 
must withdraw under the California statute. In addition, birth parents 
have the right to an independent attorney to whom prospective adoptive 
parents may be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees up to $500 
unless a higher fee is agreed to by the parties. On the other hand, dual 
representation is expressly prohibited by statutes in a number of states, 
including Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York, and Wisconsin. Florida allows lawyers to serve as intermediaries 
in independent adoptions, but prohibits intermediaries from providing 
legal representation or advice to birth parents.4 
In some states, separate representation is required only in some cir-
cumstances. Louisiana requires separate representation in all private 
adoptions, while a small number of states, including Kansas, Maryland, 
Montana, and Vermont, require separate representation for minor par-
ents.s Alabama and Arkansas require appointment of a guardian ad li-
tem for a minor birth parent.6 Maine requires the court to appoint an 
attorney for an indigent birth parent who is a minor, unless the birth par-
ent refuses or "the court determines that representation is unneces-
sary."7 New Hampshire requires representation if a birth parent who has 
not yet relinquished parental rights is incompetent, mentally ill, or is a 
person with mental retardation.8 In practice, when separate representa-
tion is not required by law, birth parents generally are unrepresented. 
There are potential risks for birth parents without representation, but as 
the debates about representation reveal, there also are risks when they 
are represented either by prospective adoptive parents' attorneys or by 
separate counsel paid for by adoptive parents.9 
Dual representation proponents argue that a conflict of interest be-
tween the parties is "often more hypothetical than real" because "both 
parties are usually strongly in favor of the adoption."10 Writing about 
how dual representation is permitted under some circumstances in Cali-
fornia, lawyer Jed Somit also contends that separate representation in-
creases costs and introduces the specter of runaway fees if the adoptive 
parents are liable for the birth parents' attorneys' fees without limit. II 
Separate representation "makes or at least stigmatizes as adversarial 
what is ideally a cooperative process." He offers the disheartening addi-
tional argument that, despite its dangers, dual representation may be 
preferable to separate representation because birth parents' attorneys 
are usually paid less and may provide inferior representation. In any 
event, it is claimed that "experienced adoption attorneys avoid dual rep-
resentation" in the "[m]any situations" in which it is not suitable. If dual 
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representation has been undertaken and a conflict arises, the attorney 
should withdraw and the parties can then obtain separate counsel, or, as 
expressly permitted in some state court decisions, the attorney may ter-
minate the dual representation and choose which paliy to continue rep-
resenting.12 
Opponents of dual representation, including the ABA, maintain there 
are "inherent conflicts" that "cannot be reconciled" between the birth 
parents' right to withhold or revoke consent and the prospective adop-
tive parents' goal of securing consent, and avoiding revocation. In this 
view, dual representation violates Rule 1.7(a) of the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, which prohibits representing a client "if the 
representation of [that] client will be directly adverse to another client," 
unless the attorney reasonably believes it will not be and each client 
consents after consultation. 13 (While the Model Rules are not binding 
on any jurisdiction, most jurisdictions have adopted some version of 
them.) A secondary issue regarding dual representation may arise, of 
eourse, if the birth mother's and the birth father's interests conflict, when, 
for example, the birth father decides to contest the adoption. If an attor-
ney believes, however, that the birth parents' interests are not in con-
flict, and both the birth parents consent, the attorney may represent them 
both. When only the birth mother is represen ted by an attorney, onl y she 
will enjoy the benefit of independent legal advice. 
Conflicts between birth and adoptive parents may arise over not only 
the ultimate issue of consent, but also issues involving financial support 
during pregnancy and birth, the timing of eonsents and of placement of 
the child with the prospective adoptive parents, and, if post-adoption 
contact with birth parents is contemplated by the parties, the nature and 
extent of future contact. The ability of parties to knowingly consent to 
dual representation is doubted, given the emotional and stressful nature 
of their situations: "It is difficult to believe [that they] can really grasp 
the essential point: that the same lawyer is advising the birth mother and 
the couple, who desperately want to obtain her child."14 Also, consent 
cannot be obtained from two interested pmties: that is, the infant child 
being adopted and the state. Finally, the Model Rules indicate that in 
any event, the eosts for services performed by two lawyers should not 
exceed the cost the same services provided by one lawyer. "If the 
savings by retaining a single attorney is obtained at the sacrifice of ade-
quate, thorough representation of each party's separate interest, it would 
seem a dubious benefit."l5 
Does any expression of doubt or ambivalence by a birth parent mean 
that the attorney must cease dual representation? Will a birth parent's 
.---------------------~ 
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interests be compromised if a conflict arises and dual representation 
ceases at a time when a birth parent's right to revoke consent is about to 
expire? If there has been dual representation, will adoptive parents be 
vulnerable to a challenge to the adoption based on a claim of undue in-
fluence or duress? If a conflict arises, is it permissible for the attorney to 
continue to represent the adoptive parents who are paying for the legal 
services, even though the dual representation has "removed the commu-
nications of the parties to one another and to the attorney from the privi-
leged category?,,16 If it is not permissible for the attorney to continue to 
represent one of the parties, will costs considerably increase in situations 
in which dual representation has been undertaken and later terminated? 
Those who favor requiring separate representation, whether in all 
cases or in a limited class of cases, emphasize the important nature of 
the adoption proceeding, the typical imbalance of power between birth 
parents and adoptive parents, the possibility of conflicts of interest, and 
the fact that many birth mothers change their minds after the birth. Law-
yers Katherine G. Thompson and Douglas H. Re1niger, for example, ar-
gue for separate representation because most mothers are young, lack 
financial resources, and are in such stressful, painful S1 tuations that their 
"capacity for rational decision-making at this time is not completely re-
liable."17 Prospective adoptive parents, in contrast, tend to be "some-
what older than most birth parents," are "usually well above average in 
income and education," and are thus more financially able to retain an 
attorney.18 
Even with separate representation, there is a danger of birth parents' 
attorneys being too closely associated with the prospective adoptive 
parents or their attorneys if the birth parents' attorneys have been rec-
ommended by the adoptive parents' attorneys or are paid by the adop-
tive parents. The danger is described in a proposed model disclosure 
form: 
There is a risk that since the money is coming from [Adopting Par-
ents] through [Adopting Parents' Attorney's] office, "I will be 
more attentive to their needs, and more cooperative with that law 
office, than I am to your interests .... However, I am an experienced 
attorney, and I believe I can represent the interests of my clients 
notwithstanding getting paid (or not getting paid) by another."19 
A similar concern was articulated by an Ohio appellate court: "We 
are compelled to emphasize that while there is no evidence of any im-
propriety as to the fee arrangement here, such may not always be the re-
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suIt. The better practice is that the birth mother be solely responsible for 
her fees, or if the adoptive parents agree to the payment of the birth 
mother's attorney fees, such payments must not be contingent upon the 
outcome of placement or adoption."2o In a case involving an analogous 
issue, a justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court noted .in a concur-
rence: "[T]he adoption agency is in the business, if you will, of obtain-
ing babies for adoption .... While an agency's advising or attempting to 
persuade a parent to consent to termination of parental rights does not 
constitute duress ... a mother contemplating termination of her parental 
rights needs distance from the agency .... The means available to insure 
that distance is an attorney ... not hired or paid by the adoption 
agency."21 Reflecting a similar concern is the advice that birth parents 
obtain attorneys through referrals independent of adoptive parents' at-
torneys. H[T]he attorney for the adoptive parents should have little or no 
control over what lawyer represents the birth parent(s) .... If the adop-
tive parents' attorney does participate in the selection process, he should 
give the birth parent at least three names of experieneed attorneys ... "22 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To help ensure that thc goals of adoption are successfully met, states' 
adoptions laws should make clear that attorneys may not simultaneously 
represent adoptive parents and birth parents. Attorneys and other adop-
tion services providers should be required to clearly inform birth par-
ents, orally and in acknowledged writings, that birth parents' interests 
are not and may not be represented by attorneys who represent prospec-
tive adoptive parents. As provided by many states and as recommended 
by the Uniform Adoption Act,n birth parents should be clearly in-
formed that they have a right to have legal representation and that their 
representation may be paid for by the prospective adoptive parents. 
It is not likely that many states will decide to require separate repre-
sentation for birth parents, despite its benefits in both independent and 
agency-alTanged adoptions, because of the costs that are involved either 
for the adoptive parents or the state. There is perhaps a better ehance 
that states will follow the lead of a small number of states, and the ree-
ommendation of the Uniform Adoption Aet,24 and will provide that par-
ents who are minors may not give valid consent to the adoption of their 
children unless they have been advised by a lawyer who is not rep-
resenting adoptive parents or an adoption agency. In any event, even 
though legal representation makes it more likely birth parents will un-
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derstand their legal rights, there remains a risk of a contlict of interest, 
as discussed earlier, when the birth parents' attorney is paid by prospec-
tive adoptive parents. If more birth parents decide to place their children 
for adoption, more work will be available for all attorneys involved in 
adoptions. 
Regardless of possible conflicts of interest, it is difficult to legislate 
the timing and quality of representation that birth parents receive. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals found that its state law requiring representa-
tion for young birth parents had been complied with in a case in which 
the prospective adoptive parents' attorney "less than an hour before the 
scheduled meeting [for signing consents] ... realized that under Kansas 
law, [the birth parents] were to be provided independent legal COUll-
sel."25 An attorney whose office was in the same suite was enlisted and 
briefed for five minutes. He then advised the birth parents and took their 
consents, satisfying the requirement that "a minor parent shall have the 
advice of independent legal counsel as to the consequences of the COI1-
sent or relinquishment prior to its execution," and the attorney "shall be 
present at the execution" of consent.26 As a concurring North Dakota 
Supreme Court justice wrote, "[m]eeting with the client immediately 
before a termination of parental rights hearing for the first and only time 
does not allay the perception of lack of independent counsel. It fortifies 
my concern that providing counsel under such circumstances is but a 
perfunctory observance of a meaningless rituaL"27 Separate legal repre-
sentation for birth parents cannot alone guarantee adoption practices 
that prevent unnecessary family separation and provide finality. Nor is 
separate representation likely to become the rule in domestic infant 
adoptions. But states and adoption service providers can and should 
take at least the simple steps recommended here to ensure that legal 
services will playas helpful a role as possible in promoting ethical and 
humane adoption practices. 
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